What are some reasons a missile silo operator would refuse a launch order?

In 1973, Maj. Harold Hering started a process that would end with him being discharged from the Air Force by asking one simple question during training: "How can I know that an order I receive to launch my missiles came from a sane president?"His point was that he felt that it would be a betrayal of his oath to launch nuclear weapons if the order came because the President was mentally unstable, or even just temporarily incapacitated. Would it be right to end the world just because the President's a mean drunk who holds a nuclear football?The Air Force was unable to give Hering an answer that satisfied him, going so far as to say that the President's sanity was outside his need-to-know. The chain of command for launch orders doesn't care about the President's mental stability. It is only concerned with proving identity. If the order to nuke Moscow is proven to come from the President, you nuke Moscow.Hering found this unacceptable and refused to agree with it. As a result, an Air Force panel recommended he be discharged.

Well, way back, Curtis LeMay refused to acknowledge the full chain command and said he would direct a full launch if he wanted to.  Also when Nixon was in his last days, and making weirder comments and drinking quite a bit, a top adviser called the military and suggested they not follow any launch orders from Nixon for the foreseeable future.    If your silo operator knew about that, they might question whether the command really came from the very top.Also I think the silos are wired up so it requires a vote not just from the two people in the silo, but two turnkey votes from a partner silo.    That prevents someone from tying up their silo buddy and using some string to turn the other key and initiating a launch.   One silo can do a launch,but it's a delayed launch, the launch notification goes out to the main control, and the launch is delayed for I think 72 hours, so they CAN launch and main control can get out there and shut things down if the launch attempt was spurious.

Under normal circumstances there wouldn't be a good reason not to comply. In the US, Russia, and China, ICBM units are divided into several sub-units (US: Wing, Squadron, Flight --- Russia: Army, Division, Regiment) with various actual missiles assigned. Under normal circumstances the operators don't know he targets they're launching at so not launching would seriously endanger the safety of your country if the higher echelons are trying to preempt an enemy attack. If not, then destroying enemy infrastructure would maximize the chance of your country recovering faster and thus be better prepared for World War IV.It would also be pointless not to fire as there are alternative ways to launch anyway (higher echelon command centres, aircraft, fellow control centres, etc.) The details depend on the country. If you want, I can provide them in detail.Now in your scenario the crew would have to reprogramme an ICBM to do so and would thus know the target. Now it is always assumed the higher echelons know better; so in case of a lethal pandemic or an enemy (alien) occupation, destroying your own city might make sense.I only see two problem here: an ICBM is a ballistic missile, you need to make sure it can physically hit the target city in your scenario. So a missile launched from Montana would have a real hard time hitting Seattle and can't hit Spokane. The other problem is that these crews rotate on a 24 hour basis, not knowing what is going on would be really hard to sell to the reader. Furthermore, the officers are also in contact with higher echelon command posts so in case something were going on (let's say alien invasion), a simple phone call would suffice to explain the situation.Good luck.BTW, in the US two Launch Control Centers need to turn their keys in order to launch an ICBM, not just one, so four officers are technically involved.

I was a missile launch officer in the U.S. Air Force.  There are indeed circumstances under which a launch officer can determine a launch order is invalid and therefore refuse to proceed.  That said, the terms of my security clearance prevent me from disclosing any more than that for another 30+ years.

I had a chance to meet some actual missile operators (retired) during a recent tour of the the launch room at Titan Missile Museum, near Tucson, Arizona and asked that very question.Unlike other weapons, they explained that the operator does not pick the target nor were they directed to specifically aim at a city, GPS location etc.   Their missiles were pre-configured with several targets that were coded and unknown to the crew.The crew would be instructed to launch a missile at say, Target #4.This helps to avoid the very conflicts you mention - how could an operator be expected to wipe out their home town, a densely populated USA city other location that poses an emotional conflict?I also asked what would happen if one of the two key-turner / button pushers refuses to launch.  Using very precise language, he explained that there are four operators on hand at all times.  Each carry a side arm. "When someone refuses an order, they become the enemy.  You know what we do to the enemy"PS If you get the opportunity, visit the museum. It's a real (also retired) Titan II missile site, known as complex 571-7 housing a 9-megaton nuclear warhead that could reach more than 6300 miles (10,000 km) in about 30 minutes. It is the only remnant of 54 Titan II sites that were on alert across from 1963 to 1987.

In the 90s movie "Crimson Tide", the submarine crew receives a launch order in one message, and then a second message starts coming in but their communications are cut off before they receive much of the second message. One guy argues they should stop since the second message could have been an order to cancel the launch; the other argues they should proceed since they have not received an authenticated cancellation order. "Outbreak" is also relevant to the scenario you described. In this case, one guy wants to blow up an American town where an unstoppable virus is spreading, for the dual purpose of ending the outbreak and covering up the fact that the virus is the product of an illegal bio weapons program he was involved with.

Lets suppose a missile launch control officer team has just come on duty.  When they exchanged the duty with their predecessors everything was nominal.  There were no threats on the board and tensions world wide were being cool.  Suddenly a launch alert comes through the system by normal means.  The launch code is verified as being properly formatted and an correct.  The keys are inserted the switch is move from ready to armed in preparation for launch in 60 seconds.  One or even both of the officers starts to doubt the authenticity of the order recalling everything only a few minutes earlier had been fully nominal now we are suddenly on the brink of nuclear Armageddon and with a turn of a key he was going to launch a MIRVED weapon and nine others like it at people half a world away killing in all likelihood upwards fo 20,000,000.  As an officer myself any officer who was in that position and didn't at least swallow really hard and say a prayer before turning that key shouldn't be down in the hole with his hand on that key.  An illegal order is not an order what if the President did go off the deep end and was about to commit a war crime by starting a war of illegitimate reasons or by reason of a simple misunderstanding between heads of state.  Peace one moment then next here comes Nuclear Armageddon with essential human extinction.  If I were that officer I would want confirmation from the man himself.  Killing one other man in authorized combat mano y mano that's not a problem for me Killing tens of millions with the flick of a key I don't know if I have it in me to do so.  Thanks be to God I will never have to find out.  I vas only following orders when I turned that key never mind that it was some colossal mistake.  glitch in  the system  some cute kid in India or some other location or a kid getting his jollies messing with government computers.  I want men in control of those keys and I want men who will think even though they have what appears to be orders to launch if they feel they have legitimate questions as to their authenticity I expect commissioned officers and for that matter middle and senior ranked NCO to exercise their own judgement.  If the situation even suggests that it would be prudent to verify orders that's what they should do.  If the orders are in fact legitimate properly authorized by national command authority and substantiated by at least one other senior member of the National Command Authority then they either turn the key to launch or they refuse and face potentially very serious repercussions for refusing a legal order in the face of the enemy.  Still the decision to turn the key or not is a human decision and it must always be a human decision rationally made all the way up and down the chain of command.  The men and women given this task and responsibility must be the very best men and women we have at our disposal.  Unlike bomber delivered nuclear ordinance which can be flown to a fail-safe position and if the situation dictates it recalled once launched whether land based or sea based the missiles will deliver their payloads even if the launch order was a mistake or in some other way in error.        

They might refuse if they got the launch order while viewing internet porn and their "key" hand was otherwise busy.  "Oh wait...I...am...almost...there! A more interesting question is whether there would be a launch officer at the console to receive the command. With the dissolution of Strategic Air Command and its Missile Command, responsibility for nuclear missiles fell under "Space" Command.  Well gee....subsequent Operational Readiness Tests showed that the organization which eschewed the draconian security protocols of SAC failed miserably.  Not just failed but called into question who exactly was guarding and controlling our nuclear ICBMs.  This caused officers to be fired and "Space Command" was shown to be lightweights unable or willing to bring the ICBM fleet back under more stringent control and operational readiness.  It all amounts to putting out the welcome mat to Spetznaz or Chinese special ops troops in the event of a war.https://www.strategypage.com/htmw/htlead/20141111.aspx

In the final interview for my corporal's stripes (decades ago ... early 70s) I was asked "What would you have done in  Lt. http://www.pbs.org/wgbh/amex/vietnam/whos/whos-calley.html's position, commanding Charlie Company." I brought it around to the order being lawful or not.I loved being in the military (Til we the industrialized nations of the north and west decided to overthrow the democratically elected government of Chile. I was in the business of interdicting Soviet assets to stop that sorta shiet.) It can dehumanize, just like some folk can choose to join a cult. But folk in uniform don't need to be robotsp.s. Major Hering had his reasons, so he lived in a manner that reflected principle and integrity. Nothing says he had to stay in the military.see PBS "http://www.pbs.org/wgbh/amex/vietnam/trenches/my_lai.html