Why was Indian National Army formed?

India–China Relations: How does Indian Army thinks to reciprocate so that it does not create extreme consequences leading to war? How that limit is decided?

• Taking into consideration the present day scenario between India and China(month:may 2013), when china is intruding into the Indian boundary. Main Questions- --""How does Indian Army thinks to reciprocate(with the only aim to push back the chinese intrusion) so that it does not create extreme consequences leading to war?"" --""How that limit is decided(intensity to reciprocate)?""    India can obviously kill all the chinese soldiers(50 or 100 ,in Indian boundary ) if it attacks suddenly with surprise (but this can only be given a thought, every one knows the reason why)!!! Once i met an Indian Air Force pilot in train(almost a year ago), we talked a lot. He told me that he has been to "joint military exercise between india and china". When I asked him "what according to you is the ground realities of preparedness of Indian Air force as compared to China". Then I was rather scared to listen to his answer. He replied that "China is about 4 to 5 times stronger than us. What ever civilians think/talk about the fact of the weapons, is only on papers and the quality difference between the weapons can only be felt and can't be written on papers and this all data reaches the civilians through the rooms of the political offices in India. India stands no where in front of China." At last he added that ""China hides a lot of fact about its ammunition to surprise the enemy. If taken that into consideration chinese become 10 times stronger than us."" (and thus an analogy can be drawn that what would happen if i meet a soldier of the other two wings i.e. army and navy) I have heard "Honarable General" G. D. Bakshi accepting these points. This is the main cause of asking this question. Thanks

• Answer:

  1) 3:1 ratio. This is a magic number that was thrown around by many  "experts" during Parakram, after 26/11 and so on. The idea is that, to  make consequential territorial gains, the attacker has to create and  sustain a 3:1 advantage in firepower, manpower etc. (including  force-multipliers) along a substantial section of the ICB (India-China  Border.) This will enable the attacker to grind down the border by  attrition. So the point is: what is true for Pakistan with  respect to India, must be true for India with respect to China also no?  PLA is not going to make any consequential territorial gains unless they  can build up and maintain a 3:1 force advantage at chosen points along  the border. If the IA can hold down this ratio to 3:2 or even 2:1, PLA  can't make significant inroads. We know that PLA has a far  better infrastructure to rely on for deployment. Yet, it  is difficult to believe the IA's logistics are so incompetent as to be  unable to prevent the buildup and maintenance of such a huge ratio at  any point along the border. So ideally, at the first rung of the  escalation ladder, we have Indian and Chinese troops deployed in all  theatres of activity but with the Chinese never enjoying the 3:1 ratio  at any point. Artillery and rocket duels take place, skirmishes occur,  but PLA cannot get anywhere. IA can hold most territory, and regain  whatever is lost in isolated Chinese thrusts. 2) The second rung  of the escalation ladder involves what may need to be done in order to  prevent PLA from gaining and maintaining a 3:1 advantage at any point  along the  LAC/ICB. A major force-multiplier for the IA is the IAF. Two  major disadvantages for the PLA are (a) long supply lines vulnerable to  interdiction, that must be held open if they have any hope of  maintaining 3:1 advantage on the LAC/ICB. (b) high-altitude airfields in  Tibet decrease the payload of flights that have to take off so far  above sea level. So the key question is: can  India prevent China from enjoying 3:1 advantage along the border,  WITHOUT using the IAF to hit logistical nuclei and arteries deep inside  Chengdu MR? Can we fight a "purely defensive" air war, as in  Kargil, never crossing the LAC/ICB to any significant extent, and yet  prevent PLA from achieving 3:1 advantage? Because if  we do use IAF in this manner we are giving an opening for China to  escalate to its own second rung of the escalation ladder. This is the  use of thousands MRBMs deployed in Tibet to hit a large swath of  military, logistics, economic and possibly civilian targets all across  north and northeast India. At this point we start taking economic hits  at a higher order of magnitude than what would be required to merely  sustain the IA presence along the LAC/ICB. Even  at this second level of escalation, PLA in general would not be able to  build up a 3:1 advantage at many points along the LAC/ICB. However,  given severe infrastructural damage that their missile strikes will be  able to inflict, they MAY be able to achieve a 3:1 advantage at one or  very few select points along the LAC/ICB, from where they will launch  the next level of escalation in the hope of ending the war in their  favour. 3) The third level of escalation will probably be  represented by a swift, massive Chinese offensive to seize a substantial  chunk of Indian territory, such as a city (Tawang, Leh, Gangtok, or  Itanagar most likely... deeper targets such as Gauhati or Siliguri  possibly) and end the war on their terms. PLA might  attempt to recapitulate the Russian victory over Georgia (2008) where,  once the Russians and their allied militias had seized the city of  Tskhinvali, it was all over but the hand-wringing and Georgia virtually  had to give up any claims to Abkhazia. http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Russia-Georgia_war Of  course, India is not Georgia, but the morale shock of losing a  high-profile target like a city, combined with the increasing economic  stress of (a) deployment maintenance (b) losses to Chinese missiles  across N/NE India might destroy the Indian will to continue the fight  and force the GOI to sue for peace on China's terms. At this  point India has very few options. There is no chance of seizing a  Chinese city of comparable size; we are simply not equipped to mount a  drive to Lhasa even at the opening stages of a war let alone after  having exhausted ourselves to the point where PRC has taken an Indian  city. i) We can dig in and hang on, hemorrhaging wealth, for a  sustained war of attrition and covert ops to unseat the Chinese from the  city they grab. Even an "asymmetric" war so to speak. ii) We  can attempt to expand our airstrikes to Chinese cities within range.  Lanzhou, Chengdu, Kunming possibly though not likely. However, if there  has been a significant air war by this point in the game, we may not  have the assets to sustain any such campaign. iii) We can gamble  very high stakes, and try to make a credible show of escalating to  nuclear exchange if the Chinese don't vacate whatever city they have  captured. Most likely we will do none of these, but sue for peace on very humiliating terms. 4)  It is therefore of utmost importance that the Chinese never manage to  grab and hold on to any substantial chunk of Indian territory,  especially a city, for any significant amount of time. In terms of a  time scale India would be prepared to fight this war for  longer than a month, possibly two.  However, China will begin to  look less indefatigable, more vulnerable, the longer the war goes on and  no significant gains can be claimed. Consider the China-Vietnam  conflict http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Sino-Vietnamese_War The Chinese were able to capture the heights of Lang Son, virtually  surrounding the capital of Hanoi. Their aim was to try and force the  Viets to draw in VA units that were then deployed in Cambodia, where  they were maintaining security after having deposed a pro-Beijing  dictatorship. The Viets saw through the Chinese plan after the  Russians shared satellite data with them regarding the PLA deployment.  They did not come out and fight any major engagements with the PLA, but  used guerilla tactics very effectively, killing over 70,000 Chinese.  Meanwhile the deployment in Cambodia was kept intact, and major  conventional units (upto 300,000 VA troops) concentrated for the defense  of Hanoi rather than trying to take back the Lang Son heights.  PLA was  hurting from the guerilla hits, and realized they did not have the  strength to ensure a victory in Hanoi without humiliating losses... so  they declared "lesson has been taught, road to Hanoi is open", turned  tail and left. The reinforcement of cities and towns will be  critical, more so than the prevention of wilderness land grabs by the  PLA. We should not spread ourselves thin trying to defend every square  inch of wilderness terrain (like the TSPA in Bangladesh) but ensure that  the Chinese never take a populated area; meanwhile, guerilla tactics  can be used to unsettle Chinese deployments on wilderness terrain within  Indian territory. The question is not just how to make the war  more costly for China, but how to dig in for a long fight that will be  least costly to ourselves. IF we can dig in and hang on, time is  definitely on our side; and if we do it without overt escalation on  anticipated rungs of the ladder, using asymmetric warfare wherever  possible, China will find itself in a position where it can either  escalate to a new order of conflict (large-scale missile/air strikes on  Indian cities, etc.) that risks nuclear exchange, or it has to pull up  stakes and go home. Loss of face will mount every day that it sits on  Indian territory taking losses while not making any significant gain. This is the point that we must push the Chinese to. 5)  At the present time there will be NO major conventional  involvement from Pakistan, simply because the US is in Afghanistan and  (for their own interests) will GUBO the Pakis into avoiding any  significant conventional misadventure. However, there is no doubt  the Pakis will do everything they can to give China asymmetric warfare  support (upto and including Kargil-type grabs if they can.) They will  activate all their proxies in J&K to create chaos in the IA's rear,  sow FUD, disrupt supply lines such as the Srinagar-Leh highway etc. This  will be no more than a headache for us to deal with in the larger  scheme of things, but we should anticipate that it will be there.