If a criminal creates a clone of herself that has all of her memories, is the clone also guilty?

Well, this turned out to be an interesting question after all, though largely due to what the answers reveal about people's thoughts on the topic.  That said, it does seem as though a great many answers are based on emotional responses or incomplete thinking on the topic (not bad thinking, just incomplete in that continuing the thought process may have revealed contradictions).  My own, admittedly incomplete, thinking on this matter is as follows: The question itself is imprecise.  Memories, are not clonable.  While they rely on biological infrastructure, they are a configuration result which is not DNA encoded.  One can no more clone a memory by cloning a brain, than one could clone a particular haircut by cloning a scalp.  This leaves one to assume that rather than "clone" the question presumes to ask about somehow creating a truly identical copy via some mechanism.  This is not just technically impossible, it is directly prohibited by the most experimentally confirmed scientific theory in human history (quantum theory).  Specifically, the Heisenberg Uncertainty Principle establishes that Heisenberg coupled variables can never be known to arbitrarily small (let alone exactly precise) degrees.  Thus it is not possible to create an exact duplicate of anything (down to the quantum scale level), nor, more importantly for this question, would it ever be possible to determine that something (or someone) is an exact duplicate of something (or someone) else.  This is not merely splitting hairs; the firing of a particular neuron may hinge on a specific quantum event.  I won't add in Schroedinger's Cat and Butterfly Effect explanations, but know that in human thought, cascade effects are real and sometimes important. However, in deference to Star Trek fans, let us assume that "Heisenberg Compensators" were somehow possible and thus a truly exact duplicate could be created and verified.  Even in that circumstance, the "clone" would not be morally or legally responsible for the criminal acts of it predecessor (at  least under US/UK legal principles).  This fact is unchanged by be the number of clones made, nor the condition or continued existence of the predecessor. Legally, guilt or criminal responsibility requires both mens rea (literally the "guilty mind") or the intent and awareness to commit a crime, and the actus rea (literally the "guilty act") or the overt action taken to effect or in furtherance of the crime.  Clearly, the "clone" lacks the actus rea for guilt as the "clone" did not exist at the time of the criminal acts.  I would think it painfully obvious that this fact does not change if one later disintegrates the "clone's" predecessor.  The issue of mens rea is slightly trickier, but nevertheless, also is absent from the "clone."  While the "clone" might have a memory of a criminal intent, this memory is a fabrication (although clearly a high fidelity one).  Again, as the "clone" did not exist at the time of the crime, it was incapable of having any intent.  By its very definition criminal intent has a temporal ordinate (it must be formed before or during the actus rea), and can thus never be manufactured after the fact.  To know that this is not just logically, but also intuitively true, one need only consider the example of a person who through a combination of psychoactive drugs, hypnotherapy, and conditioning, is made to believe and genuinely remember that they committed, and intended to commit, a crime that was in actuality committed by another.  Obviously, such a person would still not have actual criminal intent. This lack of criminal or moral culpability is unaltered by arguments that suggest that as an exact duplicate of the predecessor, the "clone" would have committed the crimes.  In no theory of law (US/UK) or moral paradigm, that I am aware of are people held responsible, culpable, or guilty, for things they MIGHT have done under some hypothetical scenario which did not come to pass.  While the predecessor was there, and did commit crimes, the "clone," while he might have, did not.  No sensible person would suggest that if one person finds an unattended sack of money lying in an alley and walks off with it, that everyone else in the state/country/world (or is later born) who would have done likewise is criminally responsible for that one person's act or should be punished for it.  If this were the case, everyone on earth would be criminally liable for literally uncountable offenses (including evidently those occurring before his or her birth). It seems that where this all breaks down is in the question of identity.  Many answers seem to either believe (or state explicitly) that people meeting the same specifications are one and the same legally and morally.  What these all miss is that inherent to concept of legal culpability and moral agency is the concept of consciousness as the fundamental prerequisite.  As the "clone" and his or her predecessor are both capable of being separately conscious at the same time (i.e. if I lock them in different rooms they are capable of having unique and un-shared experiences, thoughts, perceptions, and reactions), they cannot both be the same conscious entity.  This is unchanged by shared memories (particularly considering the "clone's" are fabricated), any more than it would be if I somehow were able to take all the thoughts an memories from one identical twin and copy and transplant them into the other.  In such an example I would have neither created a single consciousness from two (they can still experience distinct un-shared experiences, thoughts, perceptions etc.), nor would I have just succeeded in the world's first guilt and sin transplantation.

You can read a book or see a movie and obtain a memory of a crime, but it still isn't your body in the real world committing the crime. Clones or twins have no responsiblity for things other bodies have done, whether they have a memory or not.

I feel that the answer to this question depends on whether the reader believes in a "soul" or something similar that would make a perfect copy of a human distinguishable from the original human (from the point of copying of course). It is a similar question to something I've asked friends to decide: If you were to teleport yourself by breaking down your body and rebuilding it on the other side, is it still you, (It's potentially more complex than you might think). As for whether they should be convicted, well that depends on what people view the purpose of conviction. Some view it as a need for punishment (which seems petty to me), I prefer to think of it as a) a deterrent, and b) keeping dangerous people from committing further crimes and rehabilitation. In which case, it could be said that removing both the original and the copy from society would be the correct course of action.

I would say that it would make defense easy.  One simply presents the original and the clone.  One did the crime, but both remember it.  Both claim to be the duplicate and not the original.  That sounds like reasonable doubt to me.

Considering that the prison system (is supposed to) be about rehabilitation and protecting the public, I would say that even though technically the clone is not guilty as a "person", if you could call it that, but it has to be imprisoned because it would most likely reoffend and hurt other people and it needs just as much rehabilitation as the original female.

A clone would have (mostly) the same DNA, but no memories, in fact, the brain as gets physically wired by the experience may have a different structure. But lets suppose that there is a way to make a perfect duplicate at atomic/quantum level of a person by a transporter malfunction or other kind of mcguffin. Would he/she be guilty? What would change if the duplication is done before the crime or after it? Probably the first question is how fair is the justice system, how well their understand what happened with the criminal, and how prone they are to do rough simplifications (and maybe, if they are deciding before or after lunch). Even if the copy happened far before the crime was committed (i.e. one clone wanted to incriminate the already existing other) both may end in jail just because its complicated and i'm hungry. In the other direction, if the criminal is rich/influential enough may both get free because will be argued that can't be decided which one commited it. In some countries jail is more meant to work as reformation than to punishment, to try to recover a useful member of the society (even if in practice it may or not happen, or you get at the end a more violent criminal than at the start). If the duplication was done after the crime, both would need reformation. If was done soon enough before the crime, the other may be jailed for conspiration to commit it, or intention. And in both cases they have to pass through reformation. Even if its meant as punishment, you still have 2 people that had the means, the motive and the opportunity to commit the crime. If the copy is done after the crime, both (from their respective point of view) did it, like a murder done by all members of a group. And if was done soon enough commiting it, again, could be association to commit a crime. Things get more simpler when its becoming widespread to jail people for toughtcrimes, precrimes, killing people walking in suspicious ways, carrying a plastic gun or whatever, that is becoming widespread. If the copy was done far enough before the crime, you still had a copy that would had commited a crime, in a future, and in that case your wealth, skin color or country of origin may be the only things that may save you.

Yes, the clone is guilty of the murder--if the clone is a perfect replica. I had a psychology professor in college who was big on dispelling the idea of dualism, the idea that the mind and body are somehow separate. Everything that makes you who you are is contained in your brain (and to a lesser extent, the rest of your body). If the clone is an exact replica of the original person, then they are, in every sense that matters, the person who committed the crime. If you don't agree, consider the following. If the murderer has their brain transplanted into a new body, they are still the same person. There's a reason scientists call it a body transplant and not a brain transplant. As another example, consider the following. Building on what said, imagine a transporter that records everything about your body, destroys the original, and then creates a copy somewhere else. If the duplicate/clone of the murderer is not considered guilty, then a person could simply commit a murder (or any other crime), go through the machine, and not be charged by claiming they are not technically the same person. This would allow anyone to get away with any crime. The crime of attempted murder is another good example. A person can already be convicted of a serious crime even without committing the actual act of murder. So there is some precedent for convicting someone who didn't technically commit murder.

I think clone (https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Clone_(cell_biology)) is not the most accurate word for what you describe. Perhaps exact replica? I don't know that anyone knows what a real exact replica would mean in the case you describe. A criminal and his exact replica could not, as far as I know, have the same exact subjective experience, so that seems to be at least one irremovable difference between them. Beyond that, however, you are suggesting a replica to the level of detail whereby the replica would have all of the knowledge and memories of the original. So at the very least it seems to me such a replica would think just like the criminal and would also remember "his" crimes. I use scare quotes because the replica did not commit the crimes yet has no way of knowing that he did not - at least not based on his own memories. So as far as the replica is concerned, there are these crimes he committed. Well, given that information, what would the replica do? First, because he does not think he is in fact a replica, I imagine he would have the same set of responses to someone who has done something they don't want to come to light. Unless he is a totally guilt-free sociopath he would have some level of guilt and its associate physiological responses. Now, as a result, would the replica confess to the crimes or continue to hide his part in them? A true replica would likely not confess, any more than the original criminal would. So in a sense the replica would be a kind of accessory after the fact. https://www.law.cornell.edu/wex/accessory_after_the_fact Of course, this would be kind of a cruel thing to do, to create such a replica, so perhaps some would argue the actual fault lies with the replica creators. Just my two cents as a layman who is answering this question cold. I'm curious to know what others have answered, because although it is probably something that can never be done, it does seem like a thought experiment that could be quite fruitful for philosophical discussion.

Most likely no, it's not as if the criminal transplanted her conscience over and is living as the clone. Put it this way, just because you happened to witness a crime doesn't mean that you are guilty. But if the clone is a mere vehicle to commit crimes, (albeit none has been committed yet) the law may take a different measure.